an outcome can be regarded as a gain or a loss, and within the PT (and CPT), losses loom larger than gains. Tversky and Kahneman (1979) introduced a reference dependent value function, which translates gains and losses into the subjective equivalents. They argued that the value function for losses is steeper than the value function for gains, and that this asymmetry accounts for the finding that most people reject fair bets of the form (x, .50; -x, .50) . Figure 1 shows an example value function with λ = 2.25. For example, when choosing between $0 for certain and a lottery offering 50% chance of winning $10 and a 50% chance of losing $10, most decision makers prefer the safe $0 option. Figure 1 shows how the subjective value for the lottery is constructed. Here, because the psychological value of the loss is 2.25 times greater than the psychological value for the gain, the overall subjective value is negative. In one of the first empirical attempts to estimate λ, T&K92 recruited 25 graduate students to take part in a one-hour long experimental session. Participants in their study were asked to make a series of hypothetical choices between a risky lottery (involving only gains, only losses, or both gains and losses) and different positive amounts of money for certain. In the first stage of the experiment, seven certain outcomes were chosen to be logarithmically spaced between the highest and the lowest outcome of the risky alternative. In the second stage, the choices were repeated, but available choices consisted of seven new certainty equivalents that were linearly spaced between a value 25% higher than the lowest amount accepted in the first stage, and a value that was 25% lower than the highest amount accepted in the previous part. In this way, T&K92 identified the lowest amount that would be accepted instead of the gamble and the highest amount that would be rejected in favor of the gamble, and took the average of these as the certainty equivalent of the gamble. In total, T&K92 estimated certainty equivalents for 28 positive, 28 negative, and, critically for the estimation of loss aversion, eight mixed prospects.
The median parameters estimated by fitting CPT to these data revealed the median λ value of 2.25. Since T&K92's seminal work, much evidence in support of loss aversion was generated through the research of decision making and valuation in riskless contexts. Thaler (1980) famously argued that loss aversion is necessary to explain the asymmetry in valuation between owners and non-owners (i.e., the endowment effect). According to this account, the disparity between the willingness to accept (WTA) of sellers and willingness to pay (WTP) of buyers emerges because sellers regard the transaction as a potential loss, whereas buyers see it as a potential gain. Loss aversion can therefore explain why WTAs exceed WTPs in many contingent valuation studies. In the most famous example, Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1991) have shown that sellers demanded much more money to keep a university branded coffee mug than buyers were willing to pay to acquire it. Participants who were merely offered a choice between money and the mug behaved similarly to buyers, supporting the idea that sellers perceive a transaction as a potential loss (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991) . A number of studies have demonstrated that the endowment effect is robust, and that the WTA/WTP ratio exceeds 1 across a variety of items, including basketball tickets (Carmon & Ariely, 2000) , gift certificates (Sen & Johnson, 1997) , collectable cards (List, 2003) , chocolate (Reb & Connolly, 2007) wine (van Dijk & van Knippenberg, 1998) , lottery tickets (Knetsch & Sinden, 1984) , clean air (Cummings & Brookshire, 1986) , and LEGO (Walasek, Rakow, & Matthews, 2015) . The ratio of WTA and WTP for any product is commonly regarded as a measure of loss aversion, and similarly to risky contexts, it is believed to equal approximately 2.
Loss aversion proved to be particularly useful for explaining a range of phenomena in choice behaviour, both in the lab and in the field. Loss aversion has been used to provide a psychological mechanisms behind the status-quo bias (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988) , the equity premium puzzles (Benartzi & Thaler, 1995) , sellers' behaviour in the housing markets (Genesove & Mayer, 2001) , disposition effect (Barberis & Xiong, 2009) , anomalies in the labour supply (Camerer, 2001) , and many others. Within this broad stream of research, two assumptions dominate how loss aversion is interpreted and implemented in theorizing about decision makers' choice and valuation. First, people are generally assumed to be loss averse. That is, their preferences are characterized by an asymmetric weighting of gains and losses 1 . Second, the 1 A competing view could be that loss aversion represents some form of error of the decision making apparatus or an emotional response to the outcomes (Camerer, 2005) .
Nonetheless, whichever definition one assumes, it is still widely agreed on that loss aversion represents a stable individual difference in perception of gains and losses.
magnitude of loss aversion is believed to be reflected in the estimates of λ parameter of the PT and CPT. This means that the ratio of losses to gains is about 2:1, which corresponds to empirical findings described above-estimates of λ by T&K92 and the sizes of the WTA/WTP ratios (Nilsson, Rieskamp, & Wagenmakers, 2011) . In fact, the two measures are positively correlated (Spearman's ρ = 0.635), which suggests that a common psychological basis underpins oversensitivity to losses in risky and riskless contexts (Gächter, Johnson, & Herrmann, 2007) .
The observation that negative events outweigh positive events is not limited to judgment and decision making. Existing research suggests that negative events are more potent and salient, and that this negativity bias can influence individual's physiological responses, attention, learning, information search, or impression formation (for a review see Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001) . What separates loss aversion from these accounts is that there never was clear a psychological theory about the causes of loss aversion (Gal, 2006; Gal & Rucker, 2017) . The theory of loss aversion was devised to account for irregularities in the choice data and therefore its value was purely descriptive. The lack of a clear definition of loss aversion has led to paradoxical situations in which the same phenomena are simultaneously explained by loss aversion and are regarded as evidence for loss aversion (e.g., the endowment effect).
Multiple research projects focused on uncovering the sources of the gain-loss asymmetry.
Since the estimates of loss aversion tend to vary within a population, much of this work aimed to identify psychological or biological markers that correlate with loss averse behaviour in risky and riskless contexts. Multiple mechanisms and systems have been put forward and include emotions (Bibby & Ferguson, 2011; Sokol-Hessner, Camerer, & Phelps, 2013) , genetic predispositions (Ernst et al., 2014) (Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007) and emotion processing (De Martino, Camerer, & Adolphs, 2010) . Clearly, virtually any variable that is associated with loss averse behaviour is added to the list of its proximal causes. Once again, in most cases the prevalent assumption is that decision makers exhibit some degree of loss aversion in their choices and valuations.
Criticism of Loss Aversion
More recently, some authors have begun to question the descriptive value of loss aversion in risky contexts 2 . A number of studies found no evidence of loss aversion, both in typical tasks of risky choice (Ert & Erev, 2008 and in experiments in which the probabilities and outcomes associated with different lotteries need first to be learned by sampling information from each alternative (i.e., decision from experience, see Table 1 in Yechiam & Hochman, 2013 for a summary; Yechiam & Telpaz, 2013 
Current Meta-Analysis
For the purpose of our analysis, data from each existing study had to meet three basic criteria. First, since our goal was to determine the aggregate level of estimated loss aversion in the literature, our data had to come from published research. Second, parametric estimates of loss aversion in risky contexts must be based on the elicitation method that employs mixed lotteries (i.e., gambles with both gain and loss components). Without including mixed gambles, λ cannot be estimated, and so data that consisted solely of gain-or loss-only lotteries were not considered (Köbberling & Wakker, 2005) . Third, because one cannot compare λs across different variants of CPT, we require raw choice data which we use to estimate one common variant of CPT across all data sets. Fourth, our approach involved fitting the model to data using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). For this reason, we exclude a small number of studies which estimate parameters using an adaptive series of questions (Mohammed Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, & L'Haridon, 2008; Wakker & Deneffe, 1996) ,
Method
Data Collection. We conducted our literature search in three steps. First, we obtained data from twelve articles reported by Fox and Poldrack (see Table 11 .3, p. 138; 2009), of which six met our criteria for inclusion in the meta-analysis because they used a parametric methods to estimate parameters of CPT. Second, we approached the community of judgment and decision, sending a request on the 3 rd of November, 2014 (http://mail.sjdm.org/mailman/listinfo/jdm-society) asking for raw data that matched our criteria. Out of all responses, six unique articles were identified as appropriate. Finally, we conducted a comprehensive search through the Web of Science records using the "loss aversion" keyword as the topic category. This search produced 2053 results. Abstracts of all articles were read by the first author, who identified 115 potentially useful data sources. Further in-depth evaluation of each article revealed that 29 contained data suitable for estimating CPT parameters, and we contacted all corresponding authors of these works asking for raw data. Due to variety of reasons (e.g., data were lost, lack of ethical approval for data sharing, no access to individual level data, lack of response from all authors, poor documentation supplementing data) 5 , in the end, we were left with 19 data sets from 17 published articles (two articles contained two unique datasets).
Model. There are at least 256 possible variants of the CPT, depending on the parametric form of the utility function, probability weighting function and probabilistic choice rule (Stott, 2006) . The choice of the exact functional form can influence the quality of the model fit and therefore the value of the parameters that are estimated. We opted for specification that is closest to the most widely-recognized version of the CPT offered by T&K92. In the following section, we describe our modelling approach but also note where we depart from this specification due to constraints imposed by the available data.
We begin with the basic assumption of the CPT, which states that the subjective value of a mixed gamble with possible outcomes 1 ≤ ⋯ ≤ ≤ 0 ≤ +1 ≤ and their respective probabilities 1 … is:
(1)
The decision weights π + and π -are derived from a rank transformation of the outcomes'
probabilities. Following T&K92
with + (•) and − (•) representing probability weighting function for gains and losses. These equations have the effect of transforming the cumulative probability of receiving an outcome at least as extreme as instead of transforming raw probabilities.
Similar to T&K92, we used a single parameter probability weighting function,
where γ controls a degree of overweighting and underweighting of small and large probabilities.
We used a single parameter to estimate the subjective weight of probabilities over gains and losses.
The value function is concave for gains and convex for losses. Additionally, the λ parameter determines steepness the loss function and represents loss aversion. Unlike the original CPT, we did not assign individual parameters to gain and loss (i.e., α and β) function and instead used a single parameter α for both. Using logit choice rule, the probability of selecting lottery A over lotter B is given by:
with the sensitivity parameter s. We have departed from the usual form here by using the inverse Analyses. Using model specification outlined above, we estimated the maximum likelihood parameters for each individual in the 19 data sets from 17 articles. We used original estimates from T&K92 as our starting parameters, with the exception of the noise parameter (s), which was chosen from powers of 10 to produce the most evenly distributed choice probabilities in each study. The list of starting values for s is listed in Table S1 in Supplementary materials. In the case of studies that used Accept/Reject elicitation methods that involve only two probabilities (50% and 100%), we used a simplified version of the model, fixing the γ parameter of the probability weighting function to 1. We performed this analysis using both the optim package in 1965) . To help avoid local minima, the algorithm was restarted three times, continuing from the previous maximum. In instances where the algorithms arrived at a different solution, we selected parameters from the package that achieved higher likelihood.
For each study, we calculated median λ and used bootstrapping to obtain 95% confidence intervals. We then applied random/mixed-effects meta-analysis to all datasets (Viechtbauer, 2010) .
Results and Discussion
Coding the Experimental Attributes. For each study, we list major attributes of the experimental design, including characteristics of the elicitation methods. The coding was performed by the first two authors independently and the final list was agreed on collectively.
Breakdown of the attributes is presented in Table 1. = Insert Table 1 about here = Study Characteristics. Table 1 shows that 9 (52%) studies drew their subjects from the student population and 8 (48%) from the general population. Across all studies, sample sizes varied from 16 to 235 participants. Use of real incentives was common, with only two studies using hypothetical choices. However, we found that the structure of the incentive mechanism varied greatly between the studies. This is problematic since the method used to incorporate real monetary outcomes in the experimental design can influence people's preferences in risky context (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001) . Consider the case of the endowment available to the participants prior to the elicitation task. In most instances, the purpose of such an endowment is to ensure nobody can end up with a negative balance at the end of the experiment. However, even if we accounted for different currencies and exchange rates, we could not accommodate subtle but important differences in our coding scheme. For example, in some studies the money was provided to the participants one week before the study (Canessa et al., 2013; Tom et al., 2007) to avoid the experience of windfall gains that can influence propensity to take risks (Thaler & Johnson, 1990 ). Yet in other studies, the earnings from the elicitation task were combined with extra income from additional, unrelated tasks (Chib, De Martino, Shimojo, & O'Doherty, 2012). Despite the fact that most studies allowed for part of the endowment to be lost, other mechanisms were put in place to ensure no participant could end up spending money out of their own pocket. For example, in some studies the money lost could be earned back by working in the lab or was compensated by allowing participants to play out an additional lottery in the gain-only domain. In sum, we could not identify even two studies that implemented an identical incentive structure and therefore any coding scheme that separates studies into incentivized and not incentivized would be inadequate.
Elicitation methods. Table 1 shows that elicitation methods included choices between pairs of lotteries (35% of studies), statements of certainty equivalence (12%), or decisions to accept or reject mixed lotteries (53%). Even within these categories, methodologies differed in several important ways. For accept or reject lotteries-the most popular method in our sampleparticipants were presented with a series of mixed lotteries where gains and losses can occur with equal probability (i.e. 50%). Studies differ in the number of trials, the number of possible responses (e.g., "accept vs. reject" or "weakly accept vs. strongly accept vs. weakly reject vs. strongly reject") and whether trials included cases where the mixed lottery was paired with a non-zero outcome. The same issue applies to the distributions of monetary values that were used to construct possible lotteries. Distributions of gains and losses are a source of powerful context effects, which can influence the degree of loss aversion exhibited by the participants (Walasek & Stewart, 2015 , 2018a . In the data available to us, we found a great deal of heterogeneity. 
Model Fitting Results.
Median estimated parameter values for each study are displayed in Table 2 together with the 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals. Table 2 about here =
= Insert
We found value functions that were convex, linear and concave in our sample. For the probability weighting function, in six out of seven studies we found that people, on aggregate, overweighted small probabilities and underweighted large probabilities. This is consistent with findings in other studies (Gonzalez & Wu, 1999) .
With respect to loss aversion, our aggregate estimates of λ visibly vary between the studies. Our results show that in some studies participants exhibited a very strong aversion to losses (λmax = 3.45), yet in some participants showed the reverse of loss aversion (λmin = 0.65).
We also found a considerable amount of heterogeneity within each study. As Table 2 shows, the confidence intervals for λ often encompass both loss neutrality (λ ~ 1) and considerable loss aversion (λ > 2). The confidence intervals incorporated loss neutrality in 11 of the 19 datasets. In contrast, in only seven cases did our confidence intervals include the value of 2.25. In light of this clear heterogeneity, we performed a random-effect meta-analysis to determine the weighted average parameter of λ. The model confirmed that a large portion of variability in the estimated loss aversion is attributable to the between-study heterogeneity (τ 2 = 0.15). Indeed, the Q statistic is higher than could be expected by chance, Q (18) Imprecise estimates of loss aversion carry little weight in determining the aggregate model estimate. Nonetheless, it is worrying that in four studies that found losses weighting twice as much as gains, the confidence intervals are also relatively large. In a typical meta-analysis, this could be attributed to noisy estimates on account of a small sample size. In our case, it is likely that the stimuli used to reveal people's preference were not sufficiently diagnostic to estimate a true value of λ. Despite this, we investigated whether there is a relationship between the precision of the estimates and the size of the loss aversion parameter. A non-parametric correlation between standard errors and median λ revealed a considerable positive correlation ( = 0.739, < .001). 
General Discussion
When facing risky prospects, are people generally loss averse? In order to answer this question, we used a meta-analytic framework to compare estimates of the CPT's λ parameter in and fitting it to individual responses, we observed a considerable amount of both within-and between-study heterogeneity. The end result of the random-effect meta-analysis revealed a median λ of 1.31 95% CI [1.10, 1.53]. Even with a high level of uncertainty surrounding our final estimate, the observed median λ is significantly lower than the original estimate of 2.25 obtained by T&K92. In other words, while it seems that there is a lot of noise in the estimates of loss aversion, we can be at least confident that aggregate λ is much lower than 2. It is important to note that any interpretation about the population-level magnitude of loss aversion must take into account the range of methodological issues that influence estimates of λ from risky choice and valuations. Broadly, these problems arise from the difficulty in estimating parameters of a complex model such as CPT, which are further exacerbated by the features of the elicitation tasks themselves.
First of all, the results of any maximum likelihood estimation will be highly dependent on the choice of the model-the exact combination of the parametric forms of the value and probability weighting functions, as well as the stochastic choice rules (Stott, 2006) . In our approach, we chose the formulation that was closest to the original version of the CPT (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) whilst avoiding the problems in estimation that have been revealed since then (Stewart, Scheibehenne, & Pachur, 2017; Wakker, 2010) . The issue of parameter trade-offs in CPT is particularly problematic since it undermines the validity of λ as a direct representation of loss averse behaviour. Indeed, the overweighting of losses relative to gains can be captured by different combinations of parameter values, including the asymmetry in the curvature of the value function for gains and losses (α and β), as well as different elevations of the probability weighting function (γ and δ) (Pachur & Kellen, 2013) . In the present study we avoided the issue of parameter trade-off in case of loss aversion by constraining α = β and γ = δ. However, had we defined loss aversion using these pairs of parameters, our estimates of loss aversion would likely be very different. All three mechanisms described above are unique in that they assume different forms of transformations to the values and probabilities.
Another troubling point concerns the volume of potentially "poor" individual model fits.
In our meta-analysis, we avoided making any arbitrary decisions about exclusion criteria. We included all estimates of λ in our meta-analysis, regardless of the quality of each participant's responding. At the same time, we minimized the possibility of extreme parameter values driving our results by using medians, bootstrapped confidence intervals, and random-effect metaanalysis. However, excluding participants based on the pattern of their decisions is not uncommon 6 . In the original publications, individuals who showed no variability in their responding (Lorains et al., 2014; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009 ), failed to respond within a set time limit (Frydman, Camerer, Bossaerts, & Rangel, 2011; Kocher, Pahlke, & Trautmann, 2013; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2013) , violated monoticity in choice (Kocher et al., 2013) , or were insufficiently motivated (Zeisberger, Vrecko, & Langer, 2012) could be excluded. In most cases, we did not have enough information to replicate exclusion criteria employed by other authors.
All of the issues discussed above may contribute to noisy model fits. As it is clearly visible in Figure 2 , some studies show an extremely high level of variability in estimated λ. One interpretation could be that this uncertainty represents different levels of diversity in sensitivity to losses within studied samples. This seems extremely unlikely considering the size of these discrepancies. For example, it is surprising to see that the tendency to exhibit loss aversion among the undergraduate students from the University of Amsterdam was over twice as variable (Kocher et al., 2013) as the estimates of students from the University of Verona (Pighin, Bonini, Savadori, Hadjichristidis, & Schena, 2014 ). An alternative explanation is that the sources of the heterogeneity (i.e., very low and very high magnitudes of λ) within these samples represent poor model fits. The amount of poor fits can be partially driven by problematic participants (see above) as well as the design of the elicitation task itself. If the combination of outcomes and probabilities does not sufficiently constrain the parameter space, it is more likely to produce unreliable (i.e., biased) parameter estimates. In fact, recent efforts illustrate that λ suffers from poor recoverability and that most stimuli sets in the literature produce estimates with a large amount of error (Broomell & Bhatia, 2014; Nilsson et al., 2011; Walasek & Stewart, 2018b) 7 . As a result of the observed heterogeneity, some studies contribute very little to the final estimate of λ in our meta-analysis. Taken together, very few studies offer a strong contribution to our understanding of the general level of loss aversion in the population.
Even in instances when there is relatively little variability in estimated λs, we still find considerable between-studies differences in obtained medians. Meta-analytical framework offers an exciting opportunity to investigate possible moderators of this variability (Cumming, 2014) .
In the context of risky choice, the magnitude of loss aversion could be influenced by the incentive structure of the task, population characteristics or the type of elicitation task itself 7 One approach to determine uncertainty of individual model fits is to use Hierarchical
Bayesian modelling. Nonetheless we opted for MLE method as this is the most widely used approach in the field, which makes our conclusions more comparable to the findings of others.
( Bardsley et al., 2010; Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001) . It is therefore particularly disappointing that our data could not be subjected to any tests of meta-regression models. We have shown (see Table 1 ), studies considered in the present paper offer either too much or too little heterogeneity in features of their design. Consider the realization of monetary losses in the previous work.
Recent research suggests that when monetary losses are truly experienced, people's attitude towards risk changes. Imas (2016) showed that when losses are deducted from one's endowment, participants exhibit lower propensity to take risks on subsequent trials. If such losses are not realised until the end of the study (i.e., paper losses), on the other hand, participants become motivated to recuperate and consequently show an increase in risk seeking behaviour. Based on these findings, one could predict that estimates of λ will be lower when the lotteries are not played out at the end of each trial. Among studies included in the present meta-analysis, this
hypothesis cannot be evaluated, since in only one experiment gambles were played out for real outcomes following each decision. Even then, however, deduction could be interpreted as mere "paper losses" since no money had to be physically taken away from the participants. The impact of losses is further complicated by the incentive structures. Primarily due to ethical considerations, real out-of-pocket losses were not permitted in most studies reported here. Table   1 summarizes only some of the key features of the incentive mechanisms, and it is clear that the number of unique combinations is as high as the total number of studies. As such, we were unable to determine whether the between-study variability in estimated λ can be in part attributed to how participants experienced the risk of losing money. More generally, this presents a problem to all studies interested in observing and quantifying loss averse behaviour. If loss aversion requires real and tangible sense of losing one's personal money, then it seems that very few studies are in a position to claim that they created conditions necessary to elicit it.
Our meta-analysis consists of datasets that come from seventeen published articles. This may appear low in the context of other meta-analyses in behavioural sciences, many of which focus on experimental effects that are much less established than loss aversion. However, our approach differed considerably from other meta-analytical approaches in that we fitted model to individual responses of each study. This created two issues with regard to data availability. First, as we discovered, surprisingly few studies involve choices about mixed lotteries. The majority of papers that explored parametric forms of CPT focused on the gain-only domain, merely estimating the probability weighting or the value function for gains. Second, while there were relatively few works that included mixed lotteries and were therefore suitable for our review, even fewer datasets were accessible to us. Disappointingly few researchers were able or willing to share their raw data with us. This is worrisome, given how many research articles in psychology have failed to replicate in recent years (Open Science Collaboration, 2015) .
Despite a multitude of methodological and theoretical issues, how should our perception of loss aversion in the behavioural sciences change in light of these results? The exact question, and possible answers, depend on the interpretation of what loss aversion really stands for. As we have demonstrated, there is much confusion in the past literature about the interpretation of loss aversion. Our conclusion is that if loss aversion is interpreted entirely as the asymmetric steepness of the value functions for gains and losses of the CPT, then the existing evidence shows that people exhibit weak loss aversion in risky choice. At the same time, present work is insufficient to provide a very precise estimate of loss aversion in the population. Large variability for estimates of λ in most studies suggest that the methods for eliciting attitudes towards monetary gains and losses may not be appropriate. Considerable between-study differences also suggest that unobserved variables can drive the overall sensitivity to losses within a given sample. Given the scarcity of data, it is not possible to determine whether loss aversion in a risky context is a stable property of people's preferences. At the very least, our work adds to the growing body work that challenges the notion that loss aversion is robust, ubiquitous or even well-understood phenomenon (Gal & Rucker, 2017; Walasek & Stewart, 2015; Yechiam, 2018) . Note. Author names = the last name of the first author followed by the first letter of the second author's last name.
